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INTRODUCTION

From Trayvon Martin1 to Stephan Clark,2 news headlines plague
the United States to constantly remind Americans that colored
children do not get the benefit of the doubt in encounters with
authority figures—that somehow a person’s skin color skin
influences the probability of his culpability. 3 In fact, after analyzing
available FBI data, reporter Dara Lind found that “[American] police
kill black people at disproportionate rates: [b]lack people accounted
for 31% of police killing victims in 2012” while they only accounted
for 13% of the American population.4 Moreover, a Guardian study
of police killings in 2015 found that racial minorities constitute
* Lizette Rodriguez is a third-year law student at Pepperdine University
School of Law. She pursued a legal career in order to take an active role in
remedying social injustices. However, when she is not trying to save the world,
she enjoys going on adventures with her husband, having lunch with her mother,
or spending quality time with her toddler nephews. She thanks her parents and
husband for all of their support, keeping her grounded and well-fed throughout her
academic career.
1
Trayvon Martin Biography, BIOGRAPHY,
https://www.biography.com/people/trayvon-martin-21283721 (last visited Jan. 24,
2019). On February 26, 2012, seventeen-year-old Trayvon Martin was walking
home from buying snacks when George Zimmerman, an armed neighborhood
watch volunteer, shot and killed him. Id. Zimmerman alerted the police when he
saw Martin walking home, claiming that Martin was a suspicious individual. Id.
After being told not to confront Martin, Zimmerman decided to pursue Martin
without identifying himself as a part of the community watch. Id. Zimmerman’s
pursuit ended with the unarmed teenager being shot in the chest less than a
hundred yards from the door of his home. Id. Zimmerman was later charged
with second-degree murder, but was acquitted of all charges by the jury.
2
Jelani Cobb, Stephan Clark and the Shooting of Black Men, Armed and
Unarmed, THE NEW YORKER (Apr. 5, 2018),
https://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/stephon-clark-and-the-shootingof-black-men-armed-and-unarmed. On the night of March 18, 2018, police
officers shot and killed Stephon Clark in his grandmother’s backyard. Id. The
police were responding to a call that someone was vandalizing the area when they
saw Clark in his grandmother’s dark backyard and began their pursuit. Id. When
a police officer shouted that Clark had a gun, they started shooting. Id. Clark was
shot eight times and died on the scene. Id. There was no evidence of Clark having
a gun on him, only a cell phone. Id.
3
German Lopez, There are huge racial disparities in how US police use
force, VOX (Nov. 14, 2018, 4:12 PM),
https://www.vox.com/identities/2016/8/13/17938186/police-shootings-killingsracism-racial-disparities; Dara Lind, The FBI is trying to get better data on police
killings. Here’s what we know now, VOX (Apr. 10, 2015, 10:31 AM),
https://www.vox.com/2014/8/21/6051043/how-many-people-killed-policestatistics-homicide-official-black.
4
Lopez, supra note 3; Lind, supra note 3.
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46.6% of the American population, but represented 62.7% of
unarmed people police killed.5 After the killings of several unarmed
black men, the “Black Lives Matter” movement took shape to “build
local power and to intervene in violence inflicted on Black
communities by the state and vigilantes.”6
As crucial as it is to bring attention to these incidents and
demand change, it is almost equally important to dig deeper into the
issue and see that students of color7 are being disproportionately
punished in the classroom as well.8 It is a gross over-simplification
to presume that the racial disparity in public school discipline trends
is a result of students of color simply being more troublesome.
However, calling it discrimination does not make it so. In the legal
realm, there is a remedy for discrimination.9 Traditionally, to
5

Lopez, supra note 3. These statistics include deaths that resulted from the
police’s use of tasers, police vehicles, deaths following altercations in police
custody, and when officers used their guns. Jon Swaine, Oliver Laughland &
Jamiles Lartey, Black Americans killed by police twice as likely to be unarmed as
white people, THE GUARDIAN (June 1, 2015, 8:38 AM),
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/jun/01/black-americans-killed-bypolice-analysis.
6
About, BLACK LIVES MATTER, https://blacklivesmatter.com/about/ (last
visited Feb. 1, 2019).
7
The term “students of color” in this refers to African-Americans and
Hispanics. Although Asians are also a minority, they are not as prominent in
racial disparities in school discipline. See generally Bach Mai Dolly Nguyen,
Pedro Noguera, Nathan Adkins & Robert T. Teranishi, Ethnic Discipline Gap:
Unseen Dimensions of Racial Disproportionality in School Discipline, 20 AM.
EDUC. RES. J. 1, 1-29 (2019).
8
“The Department of Justice and Department of Education announced today
what we have known to be true for a long time: yes, race discrimination in school
discipline is a real problem.” Deborah Vagins, Is Race Discrimination in School
Discipline a Real Problem?, ACLU (Jan. 8, 2014),
https://www.aclu.org/blog/racial-justice/race-and-inequality-education/racediscrimination-school-discipline-real-problem. This paper will not discuss the
school-to-prison pipeline theory, but it is worth mentioning that there is a serious
concurrence with how children of color are viewed in America when it comes to
discipline, punishment, and culpability—inside or outside of the classroom.
School-to-Prison Pipeline, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/issues/juvenilejustice/school-prison-pipeline (last visited Feb. 1, 2019). The school-to-prisonpipeline theory argues that children of color are disproportionately funneled out of
public schools and into juvenile and criminal justice systems due to reasons
including underfunded schools, zero-tolerance, and other school discipline policies
that remove children from school grounds. Id.
9
Civil Rights, CORNELL L. SCH., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/civil_rights
(last visited Oct. 30, 2018); see generally What Remedies are There for
Employment Discrimination Cases?, LEGALMATCH,
https://www.legalmatch.com/law-library/article/remedies-for-employmentdiscrimination.html (last visited Oct. 30, 2019).
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establish that someone has engaged in discriminatory practices, the
accuser must demonstrate that the person intended to be
discriminatory.10 This article will discuss this notion in detail.
According to the Equal Protection Clause, to pursue a legal
remedy for this prominent racial disparity in school discipline, the
plaintiff must be able to show that the school officials intended to
discriminate against students of color. 11 In this day and age, people
are not openly declaring that their actions are a result of racial
discrimination, making this a difficult standard to meet. 12 Therefore,
this article attempts to distinguish what legal remedies are available
to the children affected and what the Department of Education can
do to address the issues that the law cannot.13
Section I considers the evolution of education in the United
States and how American society dealt with racial discrimination in
public schools in the past, and how those facts and decisions differ
from the issues that students of color are facing today. 14 Section II
explains the Equal Protection Clause (EPC) and analyzes the seminal
cases that demonstrate the power of the EPC and when it is
appropriate to use it.15 Section III introduces Title VII and walks
through violations of disparate impact discrimination and disparate
treatment discrimination.16 Section IV explains what the Department
of Education’s Civil Rights Data Collection (CRDC) is and what the
U.S. Government Accountability Office (GOA) found after
analyzing the 2013 and 2014 data on public school discipline across
the country.17 Section V analyzes the GOA study facts with the legal
standards of the EPC and Title VII to consider if Black students had
a legal remedy under the current laws.18 Section VI uses Title VII as
a template for new legislation that can better protect students against
the current trends of public-school discipline. 19 Section VII
considers what current state of the country in regard to education and
racial tensions more broadly and how Congress must react shift the
10
Equal Protection, CORNELL L. SCH.,
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/Equal_protection (last visited Oct. 28, 2019).
11
Id.; see U.S. CONST. amend XIV.
12
See generally Margaret Renkl, How to Talk to a Racist, N.Y. TIMES (July
30, 2018) https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/30/opinion/how-to-talk-to-aracist.html.
13
See infra Section I-IV.
14
See infra Section I.
15
See infra Section II.
16
See infra Section III.
17
See infra Section IV.
18
See infra Section V.
19
See infra Section VI.
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current trends.20
II.

THE EVOLUTION OF EDUCATION IN AMERICA

“Bigotry is the disease of ignorance, of morbid minds;
enthusiasm of the free and buoyant. Education and free discussion
are the antidotes of both.”21 Unfortunately, in its conception,
American education failed to be an antidote to bigotry. By the
1830s, Massachusetts established a public school open to all students
free of charge.22 Meanwhile, the other colonies relayed the onus of
educating children to the home, leaving parents responsible to teach
their children to read and write.23 In contrast, most southern states
had laws forbidding slaves from learning to read and write during
this time.24 During the Reconstruction, post-Civil War, AfricanAmericans in the South made alliances with white Republicans to
guarantee free education for all people.25 Unfortunately, when
federal troops withdrew from the South, whites regained control of
the political authority and implemented systems of legal
segregation.26
In 1896, the United States Supreme Court held in Plessy v.
Ferguson that segregation did not violate the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment so long the segregated
facilities were equal.27 Hence, the phrase “separate but equal” 28 was
born. This decision was paramount because it demonstrated that the
federal government officially recognized segregation as legal. 29
Thus, the Supreme Court sealed the fate of African-American
children’s education for nearly sixty-years, because courts were
20

See infra Section VII.
In the words of Thomas Jefferson: Why education matters, DESERET NEWS
(Feb. 26, 2015), https://www.deseretnews.com/top/3087/0/In-the-words-ofThomas-Jefferson-Why-education-matters.html.
22
Historical Timeline of Public Education in the US, RACE FORWARD,
https://www.raceforward.org/research/reports/historical-timeline-public-educationus (last visited Feb. 4, 2019).
23
Ted Brackemyre, 18th Century, 19th Century Education to the Masses: The
Rise of Public Education in Early America, U.S. HISTORY SCENE,
http://ushistoryscene.com/article/rise-of-public-education/ (last visited Feb. 4,
2019).
24
Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483, 490 (1954); see also
Historical Timeline of Public Education in the US, supra note 22.
25
Historical Timeline of Public Education in the US, supra note 22.
26
Id.
27
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 552 (1896).
28
Id. at 552 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
29
Historical Timeline of Public Education in the US, supra note 22.
21
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bound to abide by the legitimacy of segregation.30
For example, in Briggs v. Elliot, the district court held that
the state’s legislature segregating children was legitimate and
referenced Plessy as the leading authority.31 Additionally, the court
emphasized that the segregation of schools “has been held to be a
valid exercise of legislative power even by courts of states where the
political rights of the colored race have been longest and most
earnestly enforced.”32 Nevertheless, the court issued an injunction to
remedy the inequalities between the segregated schools.33 Lastly, in
its dicta, the court argued that “if conditions have changed so that
segregation is no longer wise, this is a matter for the legislatures and
not for the courts.”34 Fortunately, the Supreme Court in 1954 did not
have the same restraint.35
A. Brown v. Board of Education
In 1954, the Supreme Court changed the course of American
education when it held that separate but equal was “inherently
unequal”36—eradicating the legitimacy of segregated public schools.
In Brown v. Board of Education, the Court needed to resolve
whether public school segregation deprived African-Americans of
their Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection of the laws. 37
The Court considered multiple variables before reaching its
decision.38
First, it addressed the argument that when the Fourteenth
Amendment was adopted, racial segregation was practiced. 39 The
Court reasoned that proponents of the Fourteenth Amendment
intended to “remove all legal distinctions among ‘all persons born or
naturalized in the United States.’”40
Second, the Court contemplated the evolution of education in
30
Briggs v. Elliot, 98 F. Supp. 530, 537 (D.S.C. 1952) (“We do not think,
however, that we are at liberty thus to disregard a decision of the Supreme Court
which that court has not seen fit to overrule and which is expressly refrained from
reexamining . . . .”).
31
Id. at 532.
32
Id.
33
Id. at 538.
34
Id. at 537.
35
See infra Section I.A.
36
Brown, 347 U.S. at 495.
37
Id. at 487–88.
38
Id. at 486-96.
39
Id. at 489.
40
Id.

Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary

25

39-2

the country and how segregation affected public education. 41 The
Court compared the educational practices when the amendment was
adopted and the role education played in society in 1954.42 For
example, they considered that in 1954 education was a function of
state and local governments, compulsory attendance laws existed,
and significant government spending occurred in support of
education—demonstrating that American society now considered
education to be a cornerstone of a democratic nation.43 Therefore,
given the importance of education and the fact that the state “has
undertaken to provide it, [education] is a right which must be made
available to all on equal terms.”44 Moreover, the Court was also
concerned with the negative effect segregation had on AfricanAmerican children and their perception about their place in society. 45
Therefore, the Court held that “segregation is a denial of the equal
protection of the laws.”46
However, eradicating public school segregation did not
single-handedly remove racial discrimination in schools.
Unfortunately, racial discrimination transformed into something
subtler—not signs excluding Blacks from school buildings, but
rather, Black students being disproportionately removed from the
classroom due to discipline decisions. 47
III.

EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE

The Fourteenth Amendment provides that “[n]o state shall
deprive to any person the equal protection of the laws.” 48 The first
rule of the EPC is that policymakers cannot use suspect
classifications49 (race, national origin, alienage, same-sex
41

Id. at 492.
Id. at 493.
43
Id.
44
Id. (emphasis added).
45
Id. at 494 (“To separate [African-Americans] from others of similar age . . .
solely because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the
community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely to ever be
undone”).
46
Id. at 495.
47
See generally U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF.: K-12 EDUC. DISCIPLINE
DISPARITIES FOR BLACK STUDENTS, BOYS, AND STUDENTS WITH DISABILITIES
(Mar. 2018) (DISCIPLINE DISPARITIES).
48
U.S. CONST. amend XIV.
49
“Suspect classification refers to a class of individuals that have been
historically subject to discrimination.” Suspect classification, CORNELL L. SCH.,
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/suspect_classification (last visited Oct. 28,
2019).
42
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relationships, gender, and illegitimacy) or the statute will be subject
to judicial review according to the classification used. 50 Thus, the
Constitution is violated when a government practice or a law singles
out a suspect classification for different treatment and the treatment
is not based on a legitimate government interest.51
Moreover, “[t]he central purpose of the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is the prevention of official
conduct discriminating on the basis of race.” 52 However, the equal
protection guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment does not take
away all the states’ power of classification.53 The Court clarified
that this provision does not guarantee “equal results,” only equal
application of the law.54 “Most laws classify, and many affect
certain groups unevenly, even though the law itself treats them no
differently from all other members of the class described by the
law.”55 Therefore, if a basic qualification is rationally based,
unequal effects on different groups do not raise a constitutional
concern.56 The Court in essence washes its hands of the law’s
societal impact, because in Dandridge v. Williams it asserted that the
legislature is accountable for the reverberating effects laws might
have on society.57 Therefore, “[i]n assessing an equal protection
challenge, a court is called upon only to measure the basic validity of
the legislative classification.”58 However, an explicit racial
classification in the legislation “regardless of purported motivation,
is presumptively invalid and can be upheld only upon an
extraordinary justification.”59
As a result, for a petitioner to successfully present an Equal
Protection Clause claim based on racial discrimination, they must

50

Id.
Levels of Scrutiny Under the Equal Protection Clause, EXPLORING CONST.
CONFLICTS, http://law2.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/conlaw/epcscrutiny.htm
(last visited Oct. 28, 2019). A legitimate government interest usually is when the
law is to protect the citizen’s “health, safety, and economy.” What is a Legitimate
Interest?, LEGAL MATCH, https://www.legalmatch.com/lawlibrary/article/legitimate-interest-lawyers.html (last visited Oct. 28, 2019).
52
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976).
53
Mass. Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 314 (1976).
54
Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 273 (1979) (Feeney).
55
Id. at 271–72.
56
Id. at 272; N.Y.C. Transit Authority v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 592-93
(1979).
57
Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 487 (1970).
58
Feeney, 442 U.S. at 272.
59
Id.; see also Brown, 347 U.S. at 495.
51
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show that a state actor purposefully discriminated. 60 Systemic
exclusion of eligible people of the prescribed race or an unequal
application of the law to such an extent can demonstrate purpose. 61
Additionally, an invidious discriminatory purpose may often be
inferred from the totality of the relevant facts, including the fact that
the law bears more heavily on one race than the another. 62
Thus, when there is proof that a discriminatory purpose is a
motivating factor, strict scrutiny applies. 63 Discriminatory purpose
implies that the decision maker selected a particular course of action
because of its adverse effects on an identifiable group.64 The Court
reasoned that while it cannot control such prejudices, neither can it
tolerate them.65
A.

Cases Where an EPC Was Not Found
1.

Washington v. Davis

In Washington v. Davis, the Court established that the
racially disproportionate impact of a law does not signify that the
law violates the EPC.66 The Court found that for a neutral law to
violate the EPC, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the
disproportionate impact can be “traced to a purpose to discriminate
on the basis of race.”67 In Washington, the plaintiffs were a group of
black men that applied to be police officers in the District of
Columbia, but were unsuccessful. 68 They alleged that the
department’s recruiting procedures were racially discriminatory
because it excluded a disproportionately high number of Black
applicants.69 To be admitted into the Department’s seventeen-week
training program, an individual had to satisfy “certain physical and
character standards, to be a high school graduate or its equivalent,
and to receive a grade of at least [forty] out of [eighty] on ‘Test
[twenty-one]’.”70 After considering the facts presented, the Court
found that the recruiting procedures, specifically Test twenty-one,
60

Feeney, 442 U.S. at 272.
Id. at 279.
62
Id. at 272.
63
Id. at 273.
64
Id.
65
Id. at 272; see also Brown, 347 U.S. at 495.
66
Davis, 426 U.S. at 236.
67
Feeney, 442 U.S. at 260
68
Davis, 426 U.S. at 232-33.
69
Id. at 233.
70
Id. at 234.
61
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was a racially neutral test which served the government purpose of
pursuing a certain degree of competence.71 The Court emphasized
that the test “[sought] to ascertain whether those who took it []
acquired a particular level of verbal skill.”72 Therefore, “simply
because a greater proportion of [blacks] fail to qualify than members
of other racial or ethnic groups” 73 does not establish racial
discrimination because it is an “otherwise valid qualifying test.” 74
The Court did not place weight on the allegation that the test favored
one race over others, because members of other races also did not
pass the exam.75 Therefore, to uphold this discrimination claim
would support the idea that government actors could not discriminate
based on competency.76 Thus, the Court found that there was an
equal application of the law, even if it did not yield equal results. 77
Consequently, this distinction limits an individual’s ability to
make a Fourteenth Amendment claim because he must have
evidence to establish that the purpose of the law is to discriminate—
racially disproportionate impact of a statute is not, in itself, evidence
of a discriminatory purpose.78 Lastly, the Court rationalized that if it
invalidated facially neutral law simply because it “benefits or
burdens one race more than another would be far reaching and would
raise serious questions about, and perhaps invalidate, a whole range
of tax [and] welfare . . . statutes . . . .”79
2.

Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney

In Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney, the
Court held that the Massachusetts statute that allowed veteran
71

Id. at 245-46.
Id. at 245.
73
Id.
74
Id. at 246.
75
Id.
76
Id. at 245-46.
“Had respondents, along with all others who had failed Test [twenty-one],
whether white or black, brought an action claiming that the test denied each of
them equal protection of the laws as compared with those who had passed with
high enough scores to qualify them as police recruits, it is most unlikely that their
challenge would have been sustained.”
Id. at 245.
77
Id. at 248.
78
Id. at 247. “[A] law or other official act, without regard to whether it
reflects a racially discriminatory purpose, is unconstitutional solely because it has
a racially disproportionate impact.” Id. at 239.
79
Id. at 248.
72
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preference in state and civil service positions did not violate the
EPC.80 In her complaint, the plaintiff alleged that the statute was
gender discrimination because it “inevitably operates to exclude
women from consideration for the best [state] civil service
jobs . . . .”81
However, the Court found the statutory classification facially
neutral.82 The Court reasoned that “the definition of ‘veterans’ in the
statute [was] always [] neutral as to gender . . . Massachusetts
[]consistently defined veteran status in a way that [] [was] inclusive
of women who [] served in the military . . . [and] Veteran status is
not uniquely male.”83 The Court further analyzed whether the
neutral classification adversely affected women. 84 The Court
considered the legislative intent of the statute to determine whether
the statute’s purpose was to be discriminatory against women. 85 The
Court found that when the statute’s purpose was to “prefer
‘veterans’”—nothing more.86 Therefore, the Court held that the
statute did not violate plaintiff’s right to equal protection because
there was no evidence to support intentional discrimination. 87
3.

Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing

In Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing, the
Village of Arlington Heights denied a housing development
corporation (MHDC) its request to rezone a single-family parcel into
a multiple-family classification.88 MHDC89 claimed that its “denial
80

Feeney, 442 U.S. at 281.
Id. at 259. This case differs from Washington v. Davis because it was
dealing with a gender-based classification rather than a race-based classification.
See Davis, 426 U.S. at 233. Nevertheless, gender is included under the Equal
Protection Clause. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76-77 (1971). In its analysis, the
Court repeated the precedent that “any state law overtly or covertly designed to
prefer males over females in public employment would require an exceedingly
persuasive justification to withstand a constitutional challenge under the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Feeney, 442 U.S. at 273.
82
Feeney, 442 U.S. at 275.
83
Id.
84
Id. at 279.
85
Id.
86
Id. at 275.
87
Id. at 279.
88
Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 254
(1977).
89
The court considered the issue of standing with MHDC as the petitioner, but
found that MHDC had standing as a party “with a personal stake in the outcome of
the controversy.” Id. at 261 (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962)).
81
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was racially discriminatory and that it violated, inter alia, the
Fourteenth Amendment . . . .”90 However, the Court held that given
all of the evidence the zoning committee presented and facts of the
case, MHDC failed to prove that “discriminatory purpose was a
motivating factor in the [v]illage’s decision.” 91
MHDC was a nonprofit developer that specialized in building
low and moderate-income housing throughout the Chicago area. 92 In
the Village of Arlington Heights, MHDC entered into an agreement
with a landowner to buy a parcel of land and convert it into multifamily housing that would be subsidized and affirmatively advertised
to assure that the “subsidized development [was] racially
integrated.”93 During three public meetings, the Plan Commission
considered the rezoning request.94 The main opposition to the
rezoning request was that the area was always zoned as a singlefamily parcel and neighboring citizens relied on this classification; as
a result, rezoning would “threaten[] to cause a measurable drop in
property value for neighboring sites.”95 Additionally, the Plan
Commission was concerned that the single-family housing zones
were a “buffer between single-family development and land uses
thought incompatible, such as commercial or manufacturing
districts.”96
In its holding, the Court considered Washington v. Davis and
held that a state action that results in racially disproportionate impact
would not be found to be unconstitutional unless the petitioner can
also show that the state action was purposely or intentionally racially
discriminatory.97 Here, the petitioner, MHDC, claimed that the
rezoning denial was racially discriminatory because the decision
would negatively impact racial minorities more than whites. 98
However, the Court found that the Village had “adopted its buffer
policy long before MHDC entered the picture and has applied the
policy too consistently for us to infer discriminatory purpose from its
application in this case.”99
Therefore, with this decision the Court enhanced the
90

Id.
Id. at 270.
92
Id. at 256.
93
Id. at 257.
94
Id.
95
Id. at 258.
96
Id.
97
Davis, 426 U.S. at 261; Vill. of Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 265.
98
Vill. of Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 269.
99
Id. at 270.
91
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importance of Washington v. Davis and the rule that the Fourteenth
Amendment is not violated simply because there is evidence of
disproportionate impact. The holding highlights the Court’s
commitment to the standard that the petitioner must demonstrate that
the disproportionate impact is a result of a purposeful
discrimination.100
B.

Cases where the Court Found a Violation of the EPC
1.

Castaneda v. Partida

In Castaneda, a Texas prisoner filed a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus alleging discrimination against Mexican-Americans in
the selection of the grand jury who indicted him. 101 The Court held
that the prisoner “made out a ‘bare prima facie case’ of invidious
discrimination with proof of a ‘long continued disproportion in the
composition of the grand juries in Hidalgo County.’” 102 Therefore,
“the burden of proof shift[ed] to the State to rebut the presumption of
unconstitutional action by showing that the racially disproportionate
results came from neutral selection criteria and procedures . . . .” 103
However, the Court found that there was a motive for
discrimination even though a Mexican-American majority currently
ran the government.104 “[We] have rejected—that human beings
would not discriminate against their own kind—in order to find that
the presumption of purposeful discrimination was rebutted.” 105
2.

Loving v. Virginia

In Loving v. Virginia, an interracial married couple were
convicted of violating an anti-miscengation statute and sentenced to
not return to Virginia for twenty-five years. 106 The Court held that
Virginia’s statutory scheme “to prevent marriages between persons
solely on the basis of racial classification” violated the Fourteenth
100

See Davis, 426 U.S. at 242. This is the standard for laws that are neutral on
their face, meaning it does not include a suspect classification. Vill. of Arlington
Heights, 429 U.S. at 266.
101
Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 490 (1977).
102
Id. at 491 (quoting Partida v. Castenada, 384 F. Supp. 79, 90 (S.D. Tex.
1979)) (emphasis omitted).
103
Id. at 494 (quoting Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 623 (1972)).
104
Id. at 499.
105
Id. at 500.
106
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 3 (1967).
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Amendment.107
In its analysis, the Court responded to Virginia’s argument. 108
Virginia reasoned that the statute did not violate the Fourteenth
Amendment because, despite its “reliance on racial
classifications,”109 the law punished both whites and blacks equally
for interracial marriage; therefore, there was no evidence of
“invidious discrimination” based on race.110 However, the Court
completely rejected the “notion that the mere ‘equal application’ of a
statute containing racial classifications is enough to remove the
classifications from the Fourteenth Amendment’s proscription of all
invidious racial discrimination . . . .”111
The Court distinguished this case from other cases in which
the equal application theory had sufficed to prevent a valid
Fourteenth Amendment claim. The Court acknowledged that
Virginia relied on the holding in Pace v. Alabama.112 In that case,
the Court upheld a statute that penalized interracial adultery or
fornication because “the statute could not be said to discriminate
against [blacks] because the punishment for each participant in the
offense was the same.”113 However, the Court rejected this
reasoning in Loving and clarified that it no longer was applicable to
subsequent decisions.114 Instead, the Court asserted the notion that
“[t]he clear and central purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was
to eliminate all official state sources of invidious racial
discrimination . . . .”115 As a result, the Court found the statute
intended to limit who a person could marry116 based on her race,
while the state’s only possible objective was to maintain white
supremacy.117 Thus, the statute “violate[d] the central meaning of
the Equal Protection Clause.”118
Thus, the Court assertively rejected the theory that equal

107

Id. at 2.
Id. at 7-10.
109
Id. at 8.
110
Id.
111
Id.
112
Id. at 10 (citing Pace v. Alabama, 106 U.S. 583, 583-85 (1883)).
113
Id. at 10.
114
Id.
115
Id.
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application can be used to deny an Equal Protection claim. 119
Additionally, the Court shed some light on how a state would
possibly combat a Fourteenth Amendment claim; by showing that
the racial classification serves a legitimate state objective and the
classification is necessary to accomplish that goal.120
3.

Palmore v. Sidoti

In Palmore v. Sidoti, the state revoked a mother’s custody of
her child because her ex-husband filed a petition to remove the child
due to a change in circumstances.121 The change was that the white
mother was cohabiting with an African-American man and soon
married him.122 Nevertheless, the trial court found that there was
“no issue as to either party’s devotion to the child, adequacy of the
housing facilities, or respectability of the new spouse of either
parent.”123 The lower courts found that it was in the child’s best
interest for the father to raise her, because if she remained with her
mother when she started school she would be “more vulnerable to
peer pressures, [and] suffer from the social stigmatization that is sure
to come [from her mother’s biracial relationship].”124
The Supreme Court typically does not hear cases based on
family law.125 However, the Court intervened here because of the
facts and the lower court’s lack of adequate reasoning to remove the
child, which gave rise to the concern that the “Constitution’s
commitment to eradicating discrimination based on race” was not
respected.126 The Court reversed and held that the lower court based
its holding on race, because there was no evidence that the child’s
welfare was in jeopardy if she remained with her mother.127 The
Court stating that “[t]he Constitution cannot control such prejudices
[against biracial relationships] but neither can it tolerate them.” 128
Therefore, the Court held that the mother’s Fourteenth
119

Id.
Id. at 11. This standard is also known as “strict scrutiny.” Id.
121
Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 430 (1984).
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Id.
123
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is in the best interest of the child. Id. at 433.
124
Id. at 431 (emphasis omitted).
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Jurisdiction of Federal Courts, SE. ADA CNR.,
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Amendment rights were violated based on her husband’s race. 129
The burden shifted to the government to show how the classification
served a compelling government interest, because the holding was
exclusively based on the suspect classification of race. 130
IV.

TITLE VII

Congress has the authority to “enforce, by appropriate
legislation, the provisions of the [Fourteenth Amendment]” under the
Fourteenth Amendment.131 Under this authority Congress created
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to remedy workplace
discrimination.132 Title VII prohibits an employer “to fail or refuse
to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment because of such individual’s
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 133 Title VII’s goal is to
ensure “equality of opportunity and meritocracy” among individuals
applying for jobs—not that a person must be hired because they are
part of a group that has been historically discriminated against. 134
The courts found that Congress intended Title VII to remove
“artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to employment when
the barriers operate invidiously to discriminate on the basis of racial
or other impermissible classification.”135 The difference between the
Equal Protection Clause and Title VII is that the latter is Congress
enacted positive law, while the former is a constitutional right. 136
With that distinction, Title VII specifically relates to workplace
discrimination and provides four different avenues through which an
individual can seek relief: (1) disparate treatment, (2) disparate
impact, (3) hostile work environment, and (4) retaliation.137

129

Id. at 432.
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Kristina Campbell, Will "Equal" Again Mean Equal?: Understanding Ricci
v. DeStefano, 14 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 385, 397–98 (2010).
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Id. at 398.
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42 U.S.C. § 2000 (2018); see Pacheco v. N.Y. Presbyterian Hosp., 593 F.
Supp. 2d 599, 609 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
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Campbell, supra note 131, at 398; see also Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401
U.S. 424, 430–31 (1971).
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Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431.
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Constitutional Law, 25 CONN. L. REV. 853, 853-856 (1993).
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Legal Standard

This section discusses disparate treatment and disparate
impact.138
1. Disparate Treatment
The disparate treatment provision of Title VII makes it
unlawful for employers to use race, or any of the other
aforementioned classifications, as a factor in an employment
decision.139 Courts found that disparate treatment is the “most easily
understood type of discrimination and occur[s] where an employer
treated a particular person less favorable than others because of a
protected trait.”140 The prominent aspect of disparate treatment is
that an employer cannot treat a person differently because of a
protected class,141 which makes this provision the most similar to
Equal Protections Clause protections.142
Moreover, to bring a disparate treatment Title VII claim, the
plaintiff must demonstrate that the employer had a “discriminatory
intent or motive for taking a job-related action.”143 In order to
establish a prima facie case, the plaintiff must be able to prove four
elements: “(1) that he is a member of a protected class; (2) that he is
qualified for his position;
(3) that he suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) that the
circumstances give rise to an inference of discrimination.” 144 Once
the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, a presumption of
discrimination arises and the burden shifts to the employer to present
a legitimate and nondiscriminatory reason to justify the decision.145
If the employer satisfies its burden of production, the court will raise
a presumption in favor of the employer 146 unless the plaintiff can
138
Disparate treatment and disparate impact are the most relevant for an EPC
analysis. See generally Reva B. Siegel, Race-Conscious but Race-Neutral: The
Constitutionality of Disparate Impact in the Roberts Court, 66 ALA. L. REV. 653,
666 (2015); Kenneth L. Marcus, The War between Disparate Impact and Equal
Protection, 8 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 53, 53-83 (2008).
139
Campbell, supra note 131, at 399.
140
Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 577 (2009).
141
Lisa Guerin, Disparate Treatment Discrimination, NOLO,
https://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/disparate-treatment-discrimination.html
(last visited Oct. 30, 2019).
142
Equal Protection, supra note 11.
143
Ricci, 557 U.S. at 577.
144
Pacheco, 593 F. Supp. 2d at 610.
145
Id.; Campbell, supra note 131, at 399.
146
Pacheco, 593 F. Supp. 2d at 611.
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prove the employer’s reason was not genuine. 147 Before moving
forward with the trial, it is the “‘Court’s responsibility . . . to
‘examine the entire record to determine whether the plaintiff could
satisfy his ‘ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the
defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff.’” 148
Therefore, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the employer
manifested intent before his day in court.
Because many employment decisions are left to the
employer’s discretion, it is harder to establish intent in many
situations.149 Therefore, another avenue must be available to remedy
the discrimination that cannot be sufficiently established in this
provision.
2. Disparate Impact
In Griggs v. Duke Power Co., the Court opened the door to
Title VII claims based on disparate impact rather than disparate
treatment.150 The Court reasoned that Congress’ objective for Title
VII was to create equal opportunity employment and remove barriers
that allowed employers to favor white employees. 151 Therefore, the
Court found that “practices, procedures, or tests neutral on their face
and even neutral in terms of intent, cannot be maintained if they
operate to ‘freeze’ the status quo of prior discriminatory employment
practices.”152 This holding significantly distinguished Title VII from
the EPC because a plaintiff can seek relief without establishing
intent.
Moreover, the Civil Rights Act of 1991 formally codified the
prohibition of disparate impact discrimination.153 Under the statute’s
disparate impact provision, a plaintiff establishes a prima facie
violation when the employer uses a facially neutral employment
practice that causes a disparate impact.154 Courts typically addressed
Title VII disparate impact claims with a three-step dance. 155
147

Campbell, supra note 131, at 399.
Pacheco, 593 F. Supp. 2d at 611 (quoting Schnabel v. Abramson, 232 F.3d
83, 90 (2d Cir. 2000)).
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See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 271 (1989) (stating that
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First, the plaintiff must establish prima facie case of
discrimination.156 A prima facie case is typically established when
there is data that a policy created a statistical disparity between
members of two different groups.157 Under this provision, statistical
disparity is sufficient to demonstrate discrimination because an
employer is liable for the results of his actions, not his state of
mind.158 Nevertheless, the statistical disparity in the outcome of an
employment decision or policy must be relevant in showing that
“although neutral, the policy in question imposes a significantly
adverse or disproportionate impact on a protected group of
individuals.”159 Second, the employer is able to rebut the presented
statistical disparity or demonstrate that the policy is related to the job
and is a business necessity. 160 Third, the plaintiff can show that
there is an alternative, non-discriminatory practice, that would not
result in the disparate impact to rebut the employer’s business
necessity assertion.161
This procedure demonstrates that the objective of Title VII is
to prevent employment discrimination, yet it still acknowledges that
some practices are necessary although they might result in unequal
outcomes.162 Thus, the important aspect of the Title VII’s disparate
impact provision is that it alleviates the plaintiff’s burden to get
inside the employer’s head.163 In addition, it serves as a platform
where both parties are accountable for finding an alternative
practice, which serves its workplace purpose without ostracizing a
particular group.
B.

Case Examples of Title VII

This section will discuss Pacheco and Ricci.
1.

Pacheco v. New York Presbyterian Hospital

In Pacheco, the court held that the employer did not violate
156

Id.
Campbell, supra note 131, at 400. “Groups” refers to the protected classes
of Title VII.
158
Id.
159
Pacheco, 593 F. Supp. 2d at 620.
160
Campbell, supra note 131, at 400.
161
Pacheco, 593 F. Supp. 2d at 620.
162
Campbell, supra note 131, at 401. This is to not get in the way of
workplace efficiency. Id.
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Id. at 400.
157

Spring 2020

Stop Punishing Our Kids

38

the disparate treatment nor disparate impact provision of Title VII. 164
Both violations were based on plaintiff’s allegation that the
hospital’s “English-only” policy discriminated against Hispanic
employees.165 Plaintiff identified as Hispanic by national origin and
spoke both English and Spanish.166 The hospital granted plaintiff his
request for a lateral transfer to the Ambulatory Referral Registration
Area (ARRA).167 However, during his time in the ARRA, several
patients complained to the plaintiff’s supervisor that plaintiff and
others were making fun and laughing at them in a different
language.168 As a result, his supervisor asked plaintiff to only speak
in English while performing his duties and in the presence of
patients, but he could speak Spanish off-duty. 169 Before his ARRA
transfer probation period ended, he requested to return to his
previous department and filed suit against his supervisor.170
Taking into consideration the facts plaintiff presented, the
court first considered the plaintiff’s disparate treatment claim. 171
The court assumed that a prima facie case of discrimination was
presented and immediately considered the employer’s reasoning
behind the purported “English-only” policy. 172 The court found that
there was no discriminatory intent in asking the plaintiff to speak
English on-duty and it was a business necessity because they
received complaints about employees speaking a different language
while working.173 More importantly, the court emphasized that the
plaintiff was not prohibited from speaking Spanish off-duty, nor was
he penalized for when he did speak Spanish in front of the
patients.174 Therefore, the court did not find discriminatory intent
behind the employer requesting that the plaintiff not speak Spanish
in front of the patients.175
Second, the court analyzed the disparate impact claim and
found that the plaintiff failed to defend his claim because he did not

164
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Id. at 610.
172
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refute his employer’s business necessity argument. 176 The court
dismissed the plaintiff’s disparate impact claim because he did not
provide an alternative practice and “did not produce any evidence
that the limited English-only practice at issue was contested by any
other Spanish-speaking employees, let alone that it
disproportionately affected such employees.”177 Therefore, although
it may appear that the threshold for a disparate impact claim is low,
the court remains responsible to assure that it is not being used
haphazardly.
2.

Ricci v. DeStefano

In Ricci, the Court held that an “employer must have a strong
basis in evidence to believe it will be subject to disparate impact
liability if it fails to take the race-conscious, discriminatory
action.”178 This is a different holding because the facts were
distinguishable from typical discrimination cases. In this case, the
plaintiffs were nonminority employees that were denied their place
in the promotion pool because their employers did not use the results
of a prior test because they believed it caused a disparate impact on
minority employees.179 Therefore, the plaintiffs alleged that the
employer engaged in disparate treatment when the it “rejected the
test results solely because the higher scoring candidates were
white.”180 The plaintiffs argued that an employer could not engage
in intentional discrimination to avoid unintentional discrimination. 181
The Court considered the innate purpose of Title VII and
restated the idea that its main objective “is to promote hiring on the
basis of job qualifications, rather than on the basis of race or
color.”182 The Court reasoned that while Congress made employers
liable for neutral practices that caused unintentional discrimination,
it prohibited employers from “taking adverse employment actions
‘because of’ race[.]”183 The strong basis in evidence standard was a
way to remedy conflicts between Title VII’s intent.184 The premise
176
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Ricci, 557 U.S. at 558.
179
Id. at 562–63.
180
Id. at 558.
181
Id.
182
Id. at 582 (quoting Griggs, 401 U.S. at 434).
183
Id. at 583.
184
Id. The strong basis in evidence standard refers to the relying on possible
future litigation because of disparate impact. Id. Therefore, an employer acting on
this premise must show that they have a strong basis in evidence that they would
177

Spring 2020

Stop Punishing Our Kids

40

here was that the employer took various steps to ensure that the test
employees took to enter the promotion pool was legitimate and did
not discriminate against minorities.185 Yet, when the test results
showed that white candidates had outperformed minority
candidates—and the minority candidates threatened to sue—the
employer threw out the results.186 The Court responded that “once
[a] process has been established and employers have made clear their
selection criteria, they may not then invalidate the test results, thus
upsetting an employee’s legitimate expectation not to be judged on
the basis of race.”187 Therefore, if an employer intends to participate
in disparate treatment discrimination to prevent disparate impact
liability, they must show that there is evidence that an
“impermissible disparate impact, amounts to the sort of racial
preference that Congress has disclaimed.”188 This standard restrains
an employer’s ability to consider disparate impact minority
discrimination because Congress intended that the workplace
become a place of equal opportunity for all under Title VII.
Therefore, it appears that Title VII allows the courts to be
involved with the facts of the case when determining if a practice
constitutes discrimination.189 Moreover, Title VII allows courts to
juxtapose the statistical disparity impact with the goal of eradicating
the historical status quo in the workplace. 190 In many ways, this is a
byproduct of Title VII being a positive law created with a specific
goal.191 The goal informs judges decisions on alleged
discrimination.192

be sued unless they acted to remedy the situation. Id. This means an employer
cannot engage in disparate treatment if they guess they might be sued. Id.
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DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION DATA ON SCHOOL DISCIPLINE
ACROSS THE UNITED STATES
A.

The Civil Rights Data Collection (CRDC) Studies

Since 1968, the United States Department of Education
conducts the CRDC studies to collect data on key education and civil
rights issues in the public school system. 193 The information
gathered during the studies includes but is not limited to: student
enrollment, educational programs and services, discipline reports,
and educational equity reports.194 Moreover, the CRDC data is
accessible to the public on their website. 195 The public can search
the data by school and district.196 Therefore, individuals can look at
the data of a specific school or compare trends across the country. 197
More importantly, the CRDC collects data from every public school
and school district in the country. 198 This allows organizations like
the United States Government Accountability Office to analyze the
information to understand national issues, rather than attribute them
to idiosyncratic districts or schools.199
B. The Government Office of Accountability Study
The Government Office of Accountability (GOA) used the
information the CRDC gathered for the 2013 to 2014 school year to
identify patterns in disciplinary actions among public schools across
the nation.200 Additionally, the GOA interviewed federal and state
officials from five states to gain a better understanding of the
information the CRDC provided for the states. 201 The GOA
specifically selected the five states because there was a
distinguishable disparity in suspension rates for black students and
students with disabilities and diversity in size and location. 202
Therefore, the GOA studies go beyond the CRDC numbers because
it attempts to further understand the information to identify racial
193
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issues that are present in public schools.203 It is particularly useful
here, because simply analyzing state-by-state or district-by-district
results would limit its applicability to that region’s scope.
1. Findings
In a brief synopsis, the GOA presented its findings that
public grade schools disproportionately disciplined black students. 204
In fact, the GOA found that this disciplinary racial disparity persisted
“regardless of the type of disciplinary action, level of school poverty,
or type of public school . . . these students attended.”205 To
understand the disparities, the GOA created charts to demonstrate
the stark differences among the race of the students. 206

Nevertheless, to understand the charts in relation to school
discipline, one must understand the racial makeup of the students
attending public schools across the nation. Figure 1 demonstrates
that across the country, white students account for 50.3% of the
population, while Hispanic students account for 24.7%, black
students account for 15.5%, Asian students account for 5.3%, while
American Indian, Alaska Natives, and mixed-race students account
for 4.2% of the school population.207 Because white students
account for more than a majority of the student’s population, it
follows that white students account for the majority of other
findings. The rationale is that the racial classification should only
represent the percentage that it contributes to the makeup of the
public school population. Therefore, if a racial classification
represents a larger percent than its population in a given
classification, than it is overrepresented in that classification.
The GOA analyzed the information the CRDC collected on
203
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public school discipline across the country and created Figure 2. 208
The graph below shows the six different forms of discipline across
the country and the racial classification of the students being
disciplined in that way.209 This information can serve as the
cornerstone of an EPC claim because it demonstrates a racially
disproportionate impact through school discipline practices. 210 The
disproportion occurs because black students are significantly
overrepresented in all levels of discipline.211 In particular,
“[a]lthough there were approximately 17.4 million more White
students than Black students attending K[indergarten through
twelve] public schools in 2013 [and 20]14, nearly 176,000 more
Black students than White students were suspended from school that
school year.”212 Despite more white children being enrolled in
public school, schools punish black children more than white
children.213 Some commentators blame this tendency on other
variables such as poverty, alleging that poverty affects a child’s
development and their ability to focus in school and avoid
discipline.214 However, the GAO found that poverty levels do not
affect schools disciplining Black students more. 215
VI.

ANALYSIS

This section will apply the EPC and Title VII to the GAO
findings.
A.

Applying the EPC to GAO Findings

The Equal Protection Clause gives individuals the right to the
equal protection of the law—providing a legal remedy to
discrimination.216 However, discrimination is a legal term with
elements that the plaintiff must establish to prove discrimination and
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obtain a legal remedy.217 According to the Equal Protection Clause,
an individual must demonstrate that the state actor intended to
discriminate.218 Although a plaintiff could assert a violation of the
EPC by claiming that there is invidious discrimination due to a
statistically disproportionate racial impact, the plaintiff still has the
burden of proving an intent to discriminate.219

Unfortunately here, the ability for black students to assert a
discriminatory intent in the way their educators conduct discipline is
almost impossible because educators do not openly label themselves
as racist.220 Otherwise, the EPC requires the students to read the
mind of school officials and discover the various reasons behind
their discipline decision to prove that the motive of their decision is
the student’s race.221 Nevertheless, it is clear from the numbers that
there is a significant, disproportionate racial impact on how schools
are disciplining children across the nation.222
The facts of this situation are like Castaneda.223 In
217
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219
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220
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Castaneda, the plaintiff presented a prima facie case of
discrimination by showing a statistical disparity in the amount of
Mexican-American citizens that the state court included in the grand
jury selection process.224 The Court determined that the plaintiff had
made a prima facie case of invidious discrimination because
“‘[s]ometimes a clear pattern, unexplainable on grounds other than
race, emerges from the effect of the state action even when the
governing legislation appears neutral on its face.’”225
Similarly here, the schools’ discipline systems are facially
neutral, yet the numbers across the country show that there is a clear
pattern in public school discipline that is facially unexplainable on
grounds other than race. Thus, there are multiple theories as to why
black children have higher rates of discipline. For example, the
GAO study presented the theory that “[c]hildren’s behavior in school
may be affected by health and social challenges outside the
classroom that tend to be more acute for poor children, including
minority children who experience higher rates of poverty.” 226
However, even if outside variables, such as poverty, affect a child’s
behavior and, therefore, their discipline, should there not be a greater
correlation between poverty levels and discipline than between race
and discipline? Instead, according to Figure 6, 227 poverty does not
seem to have a distinguishable impact on discipline like race does. 228
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Even if black students could adequately establish a prima
facie case of invidious discrimination based on a clear unexplainable
pattern, they would still have to rebut the school officials’
demonstration that the discipline guidelines used “permissible
racially neutral selection criteria and procedures [that] have
produced the monochromatic result.”229 Because there is no
evidence that schools are not using neutral discipline guidelines, it is
unlikely that the students will able to move forward with their
case.230
Therefore, the EPC does not provide an adequate legal
remedy for black students statistically overrepresented in discipline
matters, because the students must prove they are receiving this
treatment because of their race.231

229
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Applying Title VII to GAO Findings

Unlike the EPC, which hinges on intent for a cause of action,
Title VII provides statutory relief for discrimination based on
disparate impact.232 As a result, black students have a stronger
footing under a Title VII claim.233
First, black students would have to establish a prima facie
case of discrimination.234 Here, the prima facie case would be the
overrepresentation of black students in school discipline across the
country.235 The court would likely find this statistical racial disparity
to be sufficient to establish a prima facie case because it
demonstrates that despite the “neutral” discipline guidelines in
schools, “the policy in question imposes a significantly adverse or
disproportionate impact on a protected group of individuals’” 236
Second, the school officials would have to rebut the statistical
disparity, or demonstrate that the discipline guidelines are a
necessity.237 School officials may argue that the guidelines are a
necessity because the children’s safety and well-being are at stake. 238
Regardless of their response, the benefit of Title VII is that it gives
the plaintiff the ability to demonstrate that there is an alternative that
would serve the same necessity.239 Fortunately, the GAO study
revealed that some schools are already taking progressive steps to
deal with the issue of racial disparity and the discipline guidelines. 240
For example, school districts across the country are “implementing
alternative discipline models that emphasize preventing challenging
student behavior and focus on supporting individuals and the school
community.”241 They are using techniques such as restorative
justice, social-emotional learning, positive behavioral interventions,
and supports.242 Therefore, black students would likely succeed in
their Title VII case against school officials for disparate impact
232

Guerin, supra note 141.
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discrimination.
VII.

TITLE E: A POSITIVE LAW FOR EDUCATION BASED ON TITLE
VII

The disparate impact provision of Title VII came from the
courts and Congress realizing that schools cannot maintain facially
and intentionally neutral practices “if they operate to ‘freeze’ the
status quo of prior discriminatory employment practices.” 243
Therefore, this positive law came from the understanding that
society cannot forget past discrimination when considering the
lasting present effects and that people can unintentionally
discriminate.244 Discrimination, regardless of intent, promotes and
preserves the status quo that this country attempted to stop when it
passed the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 245
Here, there is arguably a case of discrimination because
schools are disproportionately disciplining black students.246 To
state it more bluntly, schools are removing black students from the
classroom at higher rates than their white counterparts.247 Given the
history of African-Americans and education in this country, it is
plausible that the schools are discipling black students because they
believe the historical notion that African-American children do not
belong in the classroom.248 Consequently, the current discipline
guidelines appear to “‘freeze’ the status quo of prior
discriminatory”249 educational school practices. Given the critical
importance of education, it is time to provide a legal remedy against
disparate impact discrimination for students. It is time for Title E.
Title E would essentially mirror the disparate impact
provision of Title VII. The hope is that Title E will provide a legal
remedy for students in a way that the EPC currently does not.
Congress and the Courts recognized that finding discriminatory
intent in a person’s actions is harder than when racial discrimination
was socially acceptable in the United States—accusing someone of
racism is a serious offense today.250 Therefore, the disparate impact
243
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provision of Title VII allowed employees to bring claims when
procedures looked, sounded, and felt like discrimination, but was not
intentional discrimination.251 Moreover, the disparate impact
provision benefitted employers because it allowed them to
acknowledge a problem in their procedures without having to admit
to racism.252
A.

Legal Standard of Title E

Similar to Title VII, Title E would have a three-step process
to establish a claim of disparate impact discrimination. 253 First, the
student would have to present data that there is a statistical racial
disparity in the outcome of discipline practices. 254 As mentioned
before, Title E is not concerned with whether the educators
subjectively engage in racial bias or not. Instead it is focused on
ensuring that schools do not use neutral policies to protect a
historical status-quo that kept children of color out of the
classroom.255 However, plaintiffs cannot use Title E for every
disproportionate impact that adversely affects a child’s education
directly.
Second, school officials would have the opportunity to either
rebut the statistical disparity or demonstrate how the discipline
practices are necessary to promote their educational mission.256
This aspect of Title E acknowledges that school officials should
decide what discipline strategy is the most effective with their
students. Therefore, Title E does not intend to strip school
administrators from their agency or to hinder their ability to ensure
school safety. Instead, Title E serves as a measure of accountability.
It allows students to draw attention to procedures that negatively
affect them and forces school officials to either accept and remedy
the situation or explain its procedure to a judge.
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Third, and most importantly, the student would have the
opportunity to present an alternative procedure that would not result
in the same disproportionate impact. 257 This aspect of Title E is
critical because it puts the power of innovation and change in the
hands of the students. It allows them to take control of their
education and be agents in their communities. Additionally, it is
important because it focuses on providing an alternative to the
current procedures, instead of simply eliminating them and not
providing a replacement. More importantly, the purpose of Title E is
not to demonize school administrators—it is to acknowledge and
remedy institutionalized barriers that came from the foundation of
education in this country.
Title E can genuinely thrive because students will have the
opportunity to use their own experiences to provide an alternative
form of discipline. Students, like school officials, understand the
inward dynamics of a school and even the classroom. They can
provide critical insight into what discipline works, which can even
lead to a greater understanding between the school officials and
students as to the core of school discipline.
Thus, Title E is not proposed to be a fix-all law. Instead, the
hope is that it would be an avenue through which students could
reclaim their education.
VIII.

CONCLUSION

The Equal Protection Clause is a constitutional right all
citizens have to the equal protection of the law. However, equal
protection of the law does not guarantee equal results, and unequal
results do not signify discrimination. Consequently, for a person that
suffered from the disproportionate impact of the law to claim that it
violated her EPC right, she must show it was intentional
discrimination. She must prove that the man behind the curtain
intended to discriminate against their protected trait. However, the
difficulty of the EPC is that it is hard to prove a person’s state of
mind.
The legislature passed a positive law, Title VII, which
ensures that job applicants have an equal opportunity to
employment. Congress and the courts recognized that discrimination
could occur without anyone intending it to and included the disparate
impact provision as an avenue to a legal remedy. This opened the
door to alleviating discrimination in ways that the EPC could not,
257
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because it no longer required the plaintiff to prove thoughts, only
results.
The CRDC and GAO studies provided results that some
people knew—that schools discipline black children at statistically
disproportionate rates in public schools. The GAO numbers do not
lie. There can be alternative reasoning, but the numbers show that
there is a problem—and it is discrimination. Unfortunately, under
the EPC looking like discrimination is not enough to seek a legal
remedy. However, school discipline is an aspect of education that
permeates the student’s life inside and outside of the classroom. It is
important to question why black children experience more discipline,
instead of assuming they are more disobedient. Such an assumption
would only protect a racial status quo this country has striven to
dismantle for the past fifty-years.
It is time for Congress to rise and create positive law that
protects the children of this country in areas that the drafters of the
Constitution did not consider. It is time for Title E.

